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ST A TEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature Of The Case 
Randy L. McKinney ("McKinney"), who was originally sentenced to death for 
first-degree murder, appeals from the district court's summary dismissal of his post-
conviction petition that was filed after he was resentenced to fixed life for first-degree 
murder. 
Statement Of The Facts And Course Of Proceedings 
The gruesome facts leading to Bob Bishop's murder and McKinney's convictions 
for first-degree murder (premeditated and felony-murder), conspiracy to commit murder, 
robbery, and conspiracy to commit robbery are summarized in State v. McKinney 
(McKinney I), 107 Idaho 180, 182-83, 687 P.2d 570 (1984). Indeed, in reviewing 
McKinney's death sentence, the Idaho Supreme Court concluded, "In no other case have 
we seen such a cold-blooded, callous and wanton plan to murder a relative stranger for 
the sole motive of monetary gain, coupled with the method of killing, i.e., enticement of 
the victim to a remote area, shots to the body, and then a deliberate and calculating 
placing of, execution fashion, shots to the back of the victim's head." _lg_,_ at 186. 
The district comi sentenced McKinney to death for first-degree murder, an 
indeterminate thirty years for conspiracy to commit murder, fixed life for robbery (with a 
consecutive fifteen-year enhancement for use of a firearm), and an indeterminate thirty 
years for conspiracy to commit robbery. McKinney v. State (McKinney Ill), I 33 Idaho 
695, 698, 992 P.2d 144 (1999). McKinney's convictions and sentences were affirmed by 
the Idaho Supreme Court. See McKinney I, supra. 
The district court subsequently denied McKinney's first petition for post-
conviction relief, which was affirmed by the Idaho Supreme Court. McKinney v. State 
(McKinney II), 115 Idaho 1125, 772 P.2d 1219 (1989). 
McKinney's first successive post-conviction petition was dismissed pursuant to 
I.C. § 19-2719, including the claim that his non-death sentences for conspiracy to commit 
murder, robbery, and conspiracy to commit robbery were illegal. McKinney III, 133 
Idaho at 698-99. On appeal, McKinney contended "his two conspiracy convictions and 
robbery conviction were all lesser included offenses of the first degree murder 
conviction." Id. at 705. "Because McKinney's non-death claims were not brought within 
the statutory period for UPCPA claims," the Idaho Supreme Court refused to consider 
them on appeal. Id. The dismissal of his remaining claims was also affirmed. See 
McKinney III, supra. 
McKinney's next successive post-conviction petition was also dismissed pursuant 
to J.C. § 19-2719, and affirmed by the Idaho Supreme Court. McKinney v. State 
(McKinney IV), 143 Idaho 590,591, 150 P.3d 283 (2006). 
While state court proceedings were pending, McKinney filed a federal Petition for 
Writ of Habeas Corpus. McKinney v. Fisher, 2009 WL 3151106, *5 (D. Idaho 2009). 
The federal district court rejected McKinney's guilt-phase claims, id. at *7-20, but 
granted sentencing relief based upon ineffective assistance of counsel at sentencing, id. at 
*20-28, and ordered the state to "either begin a new capital sentencing proceeding, or 
impose a lesser sentence for murder in the first degree, within 180 days from the date of 
judgment," id. at *20; no further relief was granted, including any claims associated with 
McKinney's non-capital convictions or sentences. 
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"In lieu of appeals to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals," the parties entered into 
a binding sentencing agreement ("Agreement"), which in relevant part, states: 
a. Pursuant to Idaho Criminal Rule l l(f)(l)(C), the parties stipulate 
and agree that McKinney shall be sentenced to a term of fixed life 
without the possibility of parole for the crime of first-degree 
murder, concurrent with his sentences for conspiracy to commit 
murder, robbery and conspiracy to commit robbery; 
b. The parties agree that pursuant to Idaho Criminal Rule 11 (f)(l )(C) 
this Court shall be bound by the patties joint stipulation that 
McKinney be sentenced to a term of fixed life without the 
possibility of parole for the crime of first-degree murder, 
concurrent with his sentences for conspiracy to commit murder, 
robbery and conspiracy to commit robbery; 
c. The patties agree not to appeal from Judge Winmill's 
Memorandum Decision and Order and subsequent Judgment, 
which were entered on September 25, 2009. 
* * * * 
e. Pursuant to Idaho Criminal Rule l l(f)(l) and State v. 1\1urphy, 125 
Idaho 456, 872 P.2d 719 (1994), McKinney specifically waives 
and gives up his right to appeal the new judgment and sentence 
imposed by this Court. 
f. McKinney specifically relieves this Court from its obligation to 
notify him of his appellate rights at resentencing under Idaho 
Criminal Rule 33(a)(3). 
(#38527, R., pp.9-8) 1 (verbatim)2. 
The district court followed the Agreement, sentencing McKinney to fixed life 
without the possibility of parole for first-degree murder to run concurrently with his 
'Because the pages in the Clerk's Record in case #38527 are numbered in reverse order, 
the state will refer to them in reverse order. 
2 On June 29, 2016, the Idaho Supreme Court entered an order taking judicial notice "of 
the files and records from Appeal Nos. 14551 and 38527. 
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sentences for conspiracy to commit murder, robbery, and conspiracy to commit robbery. 
(#38527, R., pp.14-13.) 
McKinney subsequently filed a Motion to Correct Illegal Sentence, contending 
his conviction and sentence for robbery violates double jeopardy because it should have 
merged with his felony-murder conviction and sentence, and his convictions for murder, 
robbery, and conspiracy to commit robbery violate double jeopardy and I.C. § 18-301 
because they constitute "one continuous act" with his conviction and sentence for 
conspiracy to commit murder. (#38527, R., pp.27-15.) Therefore, according to 
McKinney, his "sentences for murder, robbery and conspiracy to commit robbery must be 
vacated. Defendant's sentence must be reduced to the 'indeterminate life sentence not to 
exceed 30 years imprisonment' imposed by the trial court for the charge of conspiracy to 
commit murder." (Id., p.17.) The district court denied McKinney's motion, initially 
concluding his robbery conviction is not an included offense of his premeditated first-
degree murder conviction, and then explaining that determining whether the crimes arose 
out of the same act or occurrence would require examination of the underlying facts of 
the crimes, which is not permitted when determining whether a sentence is "illegal" 
under I.C.R. 35. (Id., pp.47-41.) Because "[n]othing on the face of the record suggests 
that the sentence is illegal," the court denied McKinney's motion. (Id., p.42.) 
The Idaho Supreme Court affirmed the denial of McKinney's motion, initially 
agreeing that McKinney's robbery conviction is not an included offense of premeditated 
first-degree murder and, because McKinney was convicted of both felony-murder and 
premeditated murder, there was no double jeopardy violation. State v. McKinney 
(McKinney V), 153 Idaho 837, 841, 291 PJd 1036 (2013). The supreme court also 
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agreed that McKinney's claim that his sentences for murder, robbery, and conspiracy to 
commit those crimes violated I.C. § 18-301 was not cognizable in a Rule 35 motion 
because that question involved "significant questions of fact" that were not "clear from 
the face of the record." Id. at 842. 
McKinney then filed a pro se Petition for Post-Conviction Relief. (#42964, R., 
pp.6-12.) The state filed an answer providing general responses, specific answers, and 
four affirmative defenses. (Id., pp.42-44.) A Motion to Dismiss was also filed asse1iing 
the claims are barred by the statute of limitation under LC. § 19-4902(a), that McKinney 
waived his right to appeal and seek post-conviction relief, and, citing Small v. State,132 
Idaho 327,331,971 P.2d 1151 (Ct. App. 1999), that there was "no evidentiary basis to 
support [the] claims." (#42964, Supp. R., pp.28-29.) After appointing counsel (#42964, 
R., p.45), the district court heard argument on the state's Motion to Dismiss (#42964, Tr., 
pp.4-12), and orally denied relief concluding that McKinney's petition violated LC.§ 19-
4908 because it was a successive petition and that McKinney waived his right to appeal 
from the resentencing (id., p.11 ). Nevertheless, the court entered Findings of Fact, 
Conclusions of Law, and Order ("Order") and, after expounding upon the reasons to 
dismiss the claims, dismissed the entirety of the petition. (#42964, R., pp.52-55.) 
Judgment was entered December 8, 2014 (id., p.56), and McKinney filed a timely Notice 
of Appeal (id., pp.57-60). 
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ISSUE 
McKinney has phrased the issue on appeal as follows: 
Whether the district court erred in summarily dismissing most of Mr. 
McKinney's post-conviction claims? [sic] 
(Brief, p.9.) 
The state wishes to rephrase the issues on appeal as follows: 
Was McKinney given sufficient notice for the dismissal of Claims 2, 3, 4, 6, and 7 
pnor to the district court summarily dismissing those claims in his post-conviction 
petition? 
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ARGUMENT 
The State's Motion To Dismiss And The Hearing On That Motion Provided McKinney 
Sufficient Notice Prior To The District Court Summarily Dismissing Claims 2, 3, 4, 6, 
And 7 
A. Introduction 
On appeal, McKinney contends the district court erred by dismissing Claims 2, 3, 
4, 6, and 73 because he was not provided notice for the reasons of dismissal as required 
under I.C. § l 9-4906(b) and (c), and, alternatively, that the district court erred as a matter 
of law by dismissing Claim 4. (Brief, pp.10-19.) The record establishes that McKinney 
was provided sufficient notice of the reasons for dismissal and, even if insufficient notice 
was provided, because the claims fail as a matter of law, there was no error. 
B. Standard Of Review 
In State v. Dunlap, 155 Idaho 345,383,313 P.3d l (2012), the Idaho Supreme 
Court reaffirmed the standard of review in post-conviction cases when summary 
dismissal is granted: 
In determining whether a motion for summary disposition is properly 
granted, a court must review the facts in a light most favorable to the petitioner, 
and determine whether they would entitle petitioner to relief if accepted as true. 
A comi is required to accept the petitioner's unrebutted allegations as true, but 
need not accept the petitioner's conclusions. The standard to be applied to a trial 
court's determination that no material issue of fact exists is the same type of 
determination as in a summary judgment proceeding. 
3 Like McKinney, the state has renumbered the claims from the Petition for Post-
Conviction Relief. Although McKinney actually raised eight claims (#42964, R., pp.8-
9), the fourth claim, which raised a generic ineffective assistance of counsel claim (id., 
p.8) was subsumed in his four other ineffective assistance of counsel claims (id., p.9), 
resulting in a total of seven post-conviction claims. 
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C. Legal Standards In Post-Conviction Cases And Summary Dismissal 
"Generally, the Uniform Post-Conviction Procedure Act (UPCPA), I.C. § 19-
4901 to 4911, applies to post-conviction proceedings." Dunlap v. State, 141 Idaho 50, 
56, 106 P.3d 376 (2004). A petition for post-conviction relief initiates a proceeding that 
is civil in nature. State v. Bearshield, I 04 Idaho 676, 678, 662 P.2d 548 (1983). Like a 
plaintiff in a civil action, the petitioner must prove by a preponderance of evidence the 
allegations upon which the request for post-conviction relief is based. State v. Yakovac, 
145 Idaho 437, 444, 180 P.Jd 476 (2008). However, a post-conviction petition differs 
from a complaint in an ordinary civil action because the petition must contain much more 
than "a short and plain statement of the claim." Dunlap, 141 Idaho at 56. Rather, a post-
conviction petition must be verified with respect to facts within the personal knowledge 
of the petitioner, and affidavits, records or other evidence supporting its allegations must 
be attached or the petition must state why such supporting evidence is not included with 
the petition. Charboneau v. State, 144 Idaho 900, 903, 174 P.3d 870 (2007) (citing I.C. § 
19-4903). In other words, "[t]he application must present or be accompanied by 
admissible evidence supporting its allegations, or the application will be subject to 
dismissal." State v. Payne, 146 Idaho 548,561, 199 P.3d 123 (2008) (citing J.C.§ 19-
4903). The district court may also take judicial notice of the records, transcripts and 
exhibits from the underlying criminal case. Hays v. State, 113 Idaho 736, 739, 747 P.2d 
758 (Ct. App. 1987), ajf'd, 115 Idaho 315, 766 P.2d 895 (1988), overruled on olher 
grounds, State v. Guzman, 122 Idaho 981, 842 P.2d 660 (1992); Matthews v. State, 122 
Idaho 801,808,839 P.2d 1215 (1992). 
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Idaho Code § 19-4906( c) provides: 
The court may grant a motion by either party for summary 
disposition of the application when it appears from the pleadings, 
depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions and agreements of 
fact, together with any affidavits submitted, that there is no genuine issue 
of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of 
law. 
"Summary dismissal of an application is the procedural equivalent of summary 
judgment under l.R.C.P. 56." Yakovac, 145 Idaho at 444. "To withstand summary 
dismissal, a post-conviction applicant must present evidence establishing a prima facie 
case as to each element of the claims upon which the applicant bears the burden of 
proof." State v. Lovelace, 140 Idaho 53, 72, 90 P.3d 278 (2003). "A 'prima facie case' 
means the 'production of enough evidence to allow the fact-finder to infer the fact at 
issue and rule in the paity's favor."' Pizzuto v. State, 146 Idaho 720, 728, 202 P.3d 642 
(2008) (quoting Black's Law DictionmJ' 1209 (Bryan A. Garner ed., 7111 ed., West 1999)). 
"However, summary dismissal may be appropriate even where the State does not 
controvert the applicant's evidence because the court is not required to accept either the 
applicant's merely conclusory allegations, unsupported by admissible evidence, or the 
applicant's conclusions of law." Payne, 146 Idaho at 561 (internal quotes and citations 
omitted). Further, as reaffirmed by the Idaho Supreme Court: 
[W]here the evidentiary facts are not disputed and the trial court rather 
than a jury will be the trier of fact, summary judgment is appropriate, 
despite the possibility of conflicting inferences because the court alone 
will be responsible for resolving the conflict between those inferences. 
When an action is to be tried before the court without a jury, the judge is 
not constrained to draw inferences in favor of the party opposing a motion 
for summary judgment but rather the trial court is free to arrive at the most 
probable inferences to be drawn from uncontroverted evidentiary facts. 
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Where petitioner's affidavits or other evidence is based upon hearsay rather than 
personal knowledge, or is otherwise inadmissible, summary disposition is appropriate. 
Ivey v. State. 123 Idaho 77, 87-81, 844 P .2d 706 (1993); State v. LePage, 138 Idaho 803, 
807, 69 P.3d 1064 (Ct. App. 2003). Summary dismissal is also appropriate if the 
allegations do not justify relief as a matter of law. Stuart v. State, 118 Idaho 865, 869, 
801 P.2d 1216 (1990). 
"A court may grant the motion of either party under I.C. § l 9-4906(c), or may 
dismiss the application sua sponte under l.C. § l 9-4906(b)." Workman v. State, 144 
Idaho 518, 523, 164 P.3d 798 (2007). "[W]here a trial court dismisses a claim based 
upon grounds other than those offered-by the State's motion for summary dismissal, 
and accompanying memoranda-the defendant seeking post-conviction relief must be 
provided with a 20-day notice period." Kelly v. State, 149 Idaho 517, 523, 236 P.3d 
1277 (2010). If "the dismissal is based upon the grounds offered by the State, additional 
notice is unnecessary." Id. Where there is "significant overlap between the reasoning in 
the district court's decision and the State's motion to dismiss," the district court's reliance 
on additional reasoning not provided by the state does not make dismissal "so different in 
kind as to transform its decision into a sua sponte dismissal" that would require it to give 
20 days notice of its intent to dismiss. Workman, 144 Idaho at 524. 
D. McKinney Was Provided Sufficient Notice 
1. Claim 2 
McKinney's second claim reads, in relevant part: 
Whether . . . upon resentencing, and pursuant to the binding plea 
agreement, the Petitioner was sentenced for "premeditated murder," or 
was the Petitioner sentenced for "first degree murder" (felony murder), 
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and to continue to refer to the sentence and conviction as premeditated 
murder is not correct and violates due process. 
(#42964, R., p.8) ( capitalization and punctuation altered). 
In its Order, the district court restated Claim 2 and concluded: 
[I]t is a frivolous claim for which relief cannot be granted, nor does the 
Petitioner allege any specific violation of law, error by the Court or cause 
of action for which relief can be granted, as noted by the Court, "it defies 
belief that the State would gratuitously absolve McKinney of serving any 
sentence whatsoever for premeditated murder." State v. McKinney, 153 
Idaho 83 7 (Idaho 2013 ). 
(Id., pp.53-54.) 
On appeal, McKinney contends the district court dismissed Claim 2 on different 
grounds than those previously articulated by the state. (Brief, p.14.) However, 
McKinney concedes (Brief, p.13) that at the hearing on the state's Motion to Dismiss, the 
prosecutor stated that the claims in McKinney's petition were "obviously the same issues 
that were in the original appeals and the original post-conviction petition," and the 
merger argument "was an issue that has been brought up on appeal in these cases before, 
and there was no relief that was granted for that issue" (#42964, Tr., p.6, Ls.5-10, p. I 0, 
Ls.13-22). The quoted language from the district court's decision is from McKinney V, 
153 Idaho at 841 n.7, where the Idaho Supreme Comt specifically addressed the question 
of whether McKirmey was sentenced for "felony-murder" or "premeditated murder," 
with the supreme comt ultimately concluding, "it defies belief that the State would 
gratuitously absolve McKirmey of serving any sentence whatsoever for premeditated 
murder." Therefore, because the prosecutor asserted during the hearing on the Motion to 
Dismiss that Claim 2 was previously raised and addressed in McKinney V, and the 
district court dismissed Claim 2, at least in part, based upon that assertion, the notice 
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provisions of l.C. § l 9-4906(c) have not been violated and the district court's decision 
should be affirmed. See Kelly, 149 Idaho at 523 (affirming the summary denial ofpost-
conviction relief where the dismissal of the post-conviction petition "was based at least 
partially on the grounds that the State argued"). 
Moreover, in its Motion to Dismiss the state also asse1ied that, pursuant to the 
Agreement, McKirmey was not entitled to relief because he "waived his right to appeal .. 
. the disposition of the Court." (#42964, Supp. R., p.28.) Indeed, the Agreement 
expressly stated, "McKinney specifically waives and gives up his right to appeal the new 
judgment and sentence imposed by this Court." (#38527, R., p.8.) The district court 
agreed that, based upon the Agreement, post-conviction relief should be denied with 
respect to Claim 2 because McKinney waived his right to appeal the new judgment and 
sentence (#42964, Tr., p.11 ), which McKinney has not challenged on appeal. Therefore, 
because the district court's dismissal of Claim 2 was based, at least in part, upon grounds 
the state argued before the district comi, the court's decision should be affirmed. 
2. Claim 3 
McKinney's third claim reads, in relevant pmi: 
Whether ... the sentence imposed ( whether or not agreed upon by 
all pmiies), is illegal, as there was no provision in the laws, at the time of 
the commission of the offenses, for the court to impose a "fixed life" 
sentence (the comi lacked subject matter jurisdiction to impose such a 
term). 
(#42964, R., p.8) ( capitalization and punctuation altered). 
In its Order, the district court addressed Claim 3: 
The Petitioner's claim that the Court did not have authority to enter 
a sentence of "fixed life sentence" pursuant to the plea agreement jointly 
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submitted by the parties has no legal merit. State v. Wilson, I 07 Idaho 506 
(Idaho 1984). I.C § 19-4906(b). 
(Id., p.54.) 
McKinney contends the district court dismissed Claim 3 on different grounds than 
those previously articulated by the state. (Brief, p.15.) While it appears the state did not 
expressly state that Claim 3 should be dismissed because it was without legal merit under 
State v. Wilson, 107 Idaho 506, 508-09, 690 P.2d 1338 (1984), in its Motion to Dismiss 
the state did assert there was "no evidentiary basis to support [McKinney's] claims. 
Small v. State, 132 Idaho 327, 331, 971 P.2d 1151, 1155 (Ct. App. 1999)." (#42964, 
Supp. R., p.29.) At the hearing on the state's Motion to Dismiss, the prosecutor further 
asse,ted, "There certainly is no evidentiary basis to support any of those legal claims." 
(#42965, p.6, Ls.23-24.) In the context of this specific claim, the lack of evidentiary 
support was sufficient notice to McKinney because no amount of evidentiary suppo1t 
would have salvaged Claim 3 since it fails as a matter of law. As explained in Wilson, 
I 07 Idaho at 508-09, McKinney's claim that the district court could not impose a fixed 
life sentence for first-degree murder is without merit and fails as a matter of law. See 
also State v. Merrifield, 112 Idaho 365, 366, 732 P.2d 334 (Ct. App. 1987) ("Under 
Wilson, the district court's sentencing options for the underlying crime of first-degree 
murder were limited to a fixed or indeterminate life sentence."); State v. Nellsch, 110 
Idaho 594, 595, 716 P .2d 1366 (Ct. App. 1986) ("If the death penalty is not imposed, then 
only a life sentence-which may be either fixed or indeterminate-shall be imposed."). 
Alternatively, should this Court determine the state's assertion that there was no 
evidentiary support for Claim 3 constituted insufficient notice, there is no need for 
remand where a post-conviction claim fails as a matter of law irrespective of the amount 
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of evidentiary support. The underlying purpose of providing post-conviction petitioners 
notice of the basis for dismissal is to give the petitioner an oppo1iunity to provide further 
legal authority or evidence to establish a genuine issue of material fact. Fetterly v. State, 
121 Idaho 417,418,825 P.2d 1073 (1991); State v. Christensen, 102 Idaho 487,489,632 
P.2d 676 (1981); Martinez v. State, 126 Idaho 813,818,892 P.2d 488 (Ct. App. 1995). 
Where no amount of additional legal authority or evidence will result in a cognizable 
claim or a genuine issue of material fact, there is no basis for remand. Therefore, because 
Claim 3 fails as a matter of law, there is no reason for remand and the district court's 
decision should be affirmed. 
3. Claim 4 
McKinney's fomih claim reads, in relevant part: 
Counsel, during the plea negotiations which lead to the binding 
plea and the re-sentencing in this case, informed me that I would be re-
sentenced to first degree murder (felony mmder), not premeditated 
murder. 
(#42964, R., p.9) ( capitalization and punctuation altered). 
In its Order, the district court addressed Claim 4: 
Petitioner's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel for not 
informing Petitioner of the charge he was sentenced [to] on November 18, 
2009(,] fails to allege deficient conduct by his counsel and asserts no facts 
contrary to the record. The Court's colloquy specifically told Petitioner 
the charge in which he was being sentenced. Petitioner acknowledged he 
understood the charge and his wish to proceed. Petitioner's claim also 
fails to allege how Petitioner has been prejudiced by his allegation. 
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052 (l 984); Mitchell 
v. State, 132 Idaho 274 (Idaho 1998). 
(Id., p.54) (punctuation altered). 
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McKinney contends the district court dismissed Claim 4 on different grounds than 
those previously articulated by the state. (Brief, p.16.) However, in its Motion to 
Dismiss the state expressly stated there was "no evidentiary basis to support his claims. 
Small v. State, 132 Idaho 327,331,971 P.2d 1151, 1155 (Ct. App. 1999)." (#42964, 
Supp. R., p.29.) At the hearing on the state's Motion to Dismiss, the prosecutor 
reasserted, "There certainly is no evidentiary basis to support any of those legal claims." 
(#42964, Tr., p.6, Ls.23-24.) The district court's conclusions that McKinney's fourth 
claim "fails to allege deficient conduct by his counsel and asserts no facts contrary to the 
record" and that the "claim also fails to allege how [McKinney] has been prejudiced by 
his allegation" are based upon the state's asse1tion in its Motion to Dismiss that there was 
"no evidentiary basis to support his claims." Even though there may have been 
additional bases adopted by the district court for dismissal of Claim 4, based upon the 
language from the state's Motion to Dismiss, McKinney has failed to establish he was not 
provided sufficient notice regarding part of the basis for dismissal of Claim 4. See 
Workman, 144 Idaho at 524. Therefore, the district court's decision should be affirmed.4 
4. Claim 6 
Similar to McKinney's third claim, which raises a substantive claim regarding the 
legality of a fixed life sentence for first degree murder (#42964, R., p.8), McKinney's 
sixth claim raises ineffective assistance of counsel, and reads: 
4 McKinney also contends the district court erred by concluding Claim 4 was waived as 
part of the Agreement. (Brief, p.16.) To the extent the district court's decision was based 
upon a waiver of post-conviction rights stemming from the Agreement, the state agrees; 
the agreement does not contain a waiver of post-conviction rights. However, as 
explained above, because of the other bases for summary dismissal of Claim 4 that were 
utilized by the district comt, any alleged error stemming from the district court's alleged 
conclusion that the Agreement included a waiver of post-conviction rights is harmless. 
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Counsel for the Petitioner failed to recognize that at the time of the 
commission of the offenses Idaho law provided for the sentence(s) of 
death, or life in prisonment [sic] for the crime of first degree murder. 
There was no sentence possible for a "fixed life term," and as such counsel 
was ineffective for allowing me to be sentenced at the time I was re-
sentenced to a term that the court lacked statutory authority to impose. 
(Id., p.9) ( capitalization and punctuation altered). 
In its Order, the district court addressed Claim 6: 
Petitioner's claim regarding his counsel's alleged deficient 
performance regarding the sentence of a fixed term of life is without merit, 
since such an argument is contrary to law. Furthermore, such an argument 
being contrary to law, the absence of such an argument callllot create 
prejudice to the Petitioner. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 
S.Ct. 2052 (1984); Mitchell v. State, 132 Idaho 274 (Idaho 1998). 
(Id., pp.54-55) (punctuation altered). 
On appeal, McKinney contends the district court dismissed Claim 6 on different 
grounds than those previously articulated by the state. (Brief, p.17 .) Although Claim 6 is 
based upon ineffective assistance of counsel and govemed by the dictates of Strickland v. 
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984), which requires that McKinney establish his 
attomey's representation was deficient and that the deficiency was prejudicial, the same 
analysis from Claim 3 applies to this claim. Under Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688, 
McKinney has the burden of first establishing counsel's performance "fell below an 
objective standard of reasonableness." Additionally, McKinney has the burden of 
establishing "a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors the 
result of the proceeding would have been different. A reasonable probability is a 
probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome," id. at 694, which 
"requires a substantial, not just conceivable, likelihood of a different result," Cullen v. 
Pinholster, 563 U.S. 170, 189 (2011) (intemal quotations and citation omitted). 
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In its Motion to Dismiss, the state asserted there was "no evidentiary basis to 
support [McKinney's] claims." (#42964, Supp. R., p.29.) At the hearing on the state's 
Motion to Dismiss, the prosecutor reasse1ied, "There certainly is no evidentiary basis to 
support any of those legal claims." (#42964, Tr., p.6, Ls.23-24.) As with Claim 3, in the 
context of this specific claim, the lack of evidentiary support was sufficient notice to 
McKinney because no amount of evidentiary support would have salvaged Claim 6 since 
it fails as a matter of law. As explained above, McKinney's assertion that Idaho law 
prohibited the imposition of a fixed life sentence for first-degree murder is incorrect. 
Therefore, as a matter of law, the evidence supporting Claim 6 was insufficient because 
his counsel's performance could not have been deficient since Idaho law expressly 
permitted a fixed life sentence; nor could McKinney have alleged sufficient facts to 
establish prejudice. Because McKinney was provided sufficient notice of the basis for 
the district court's dismissal, his argument fails, and the district court should be affirmed. 
Alternatively, as discussed above regarding Claim 3, because Claim 6 fails as a matter of 
law, there is no basis for remand and the district court's decision should be affirmed. 
5. Claim 7 
McKinney's seventh claim states, "Counsel failed to consult Petitioner about 
appeal." (#42964, p.9.) In its Order, the district court addressed Claim 7: 
Petitioner's claim regarding his counsel failing to advise him 
regarding the right to appeal has no basis in fact, and is without merit. 
The Court specifically addressed this issue on the record with Petitioner 
on November 18, 2009. Thus, Petitioner has not offered any facts or 
allegation contrary to the transcript of how this issue could create 
prejudice. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052 
(1984); Mitchell v. State, 132 Idaho 274 (Idaho 1998). 
(Id., p.55) (punctuation altered). 
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McKinney contends the district court dismissed Claim 7 on different grounds than 
those previously articulated by the state. (Brief, p.19.) However, as recognized by 
McKinney (Brief, p.18), in its Motion to Dismiss the state expressly stated there was "no 
evidentiary basis to support [McKinney's] claims" (#42964, Supp. R., p.29), and during 
the hearing on the state's Motion to Dismiss the prosecutor stated, "There certainly is no 
evidentiary basis to support any of those legal claims" (#42964, Tr., p.6, Ls.23-24). As 
conceded by McKinney (Brief, p.19), the district court dismissed Claim 7 because it had 
"no basis in fact" and McKinney "has not offered any facts or allegations contrary to the 
transcript of how this issue could create prejudice." (#42964, R., p.55.) Obviously, the 
district court's decision was based upon McKinney's failure to supp011 Claim 7 with 
sufficient evidence as alleged by the state in its Motion to Dismiss and at the hearing. 
Irrespective, like Claims 3 and 6, McKinney's Claim 7 also fails as a matter of 
law because he expressly waived his right to appeal in the Agreement: 
Pursuant to Idaho Criminal Rule I l(f)(I) and State v. Murphy, 125 
Idaho 456, 872 P.2d 719 (1994), McKinney specifically waives and gives 
up his right to appeal the new judgment and sentence imposed by this 
Court. 
(#38527, R., p.8.) 
As a result of McKinney's waiver of his right to appeal, he was barred from filing 
an appeal, State v. Murphy, 125 Idaho 456, 872 P.2d 719 (1994), which resulted in him 
being unable to establish either deficient performance or prejudice even if counsel failed 
to consult with him about the appeal. Indeed, McKinney was expressly questioned, under 
oath, during the colloquy at the time of his resentencing regarding his waiver of his 
appellate rights: 
18 
THE COURT: We talked about appealing the decision from the 
Federal District Court. That also applies to an appeal on this case. So 
once sentencing is entered on this pmticular charge, you're waiving the 
right to appeal this sentence pursuant to this plea agreement. Do you 
understand that? 
THE DEFENDANT: Yes. I'm comfortable with that. 
(#38527, Tr., p.6, Ls.11-21.) McKinney agreed that he "had a full and fair opportunity to 
review this agreement and discuss that with [his] counsel," that there were no other terms 
of the agreement that had not been discussed, and that he "participated in this sentence 
agreement freely and voluntarily." (Id., p.7, Ls.14-25.) 
Based upon the agreement, coupled with the colloquy, any claim of ineffective 
assistance of counsel for failing to consult McKinney about the appeal fails as a matter of 
law. In other words, like Claims 3 and 6, there are no additional facts or legal authority 
that would have resulted in a viable claim even if additional or different notice had been 
provided. Therefore, the district court's decision regarding Claim 7 should be affirmed. 
CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests that the district court's Findings of Fact, Conclusions of 
Law and Order denying McKinney's post-conviction petition be affirmed. 
DA TED this 261" day of October, 2016. 
/s/ 
L.LaMONT ANDERSON 
Deputy Attorney General 
Chief, Capital Litigation Unit 
19 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 261h day of October, 2016, served a true and 
correct copy of the attached RESPONDENT'S BRIEF by emailing an electronic copy to: 
ERIK R. LEHTINEN 
DEPUTY STA TE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER 
at the following email address: briefs@sapd.state.id.us. 
20 
Isl 
L. LaMONT ANDERSON 
Deputy Attorney General 
Chief, Capital Litigation Unit 
